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Katz and the Fourth Amendment:
A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
or,
A Man's Home Is His Fort
No doubt it is comforting to be told that one's privacy is as
fully protected in a public telephone booth as it is at home.
But it is less reassuring to realize that one's privacy is no
better protected at home than in a public telephone booth.'
T HE INTERPRETATION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT rights and their ap-
plication to individual situations has been a troublesome problem
even for the United States Supreme Court.2 The Court itself has rec-
ognized that the translation of fourth amendment protection from an
abstract principle into workable guidelines has been a "difficult task"
over which it has been divided for many years.3
While there are a great many cases and commentaries treating
fourth amendment rights, little attention has been given to the cir-
cumstances that must exist in order for it to be said that a search and
seizure has taken place.4 The purpose of this note is to explore the
issues involved in determining when the conduct of law enforcement
officers constitutes a search and seizure.5 Consideration will be given
to Katz v. United States,6 which established the test to be applied in
IT. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 114 (1969).
2 State v. King, 191 N.W.2d 650, 654 (Iowa 1971).
3 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 474 (1971).
4 This issue has received attention in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) and
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
5 There is both conflict and uncertainty over the conduct encompassed by the words "search"
and "seizure" -especially as they relate to aural and visual intrusions. The issues involved
are beyond the scope of this note and the use of terms such as "search and seizure" and
"fourth amendment rights" is an attempt to avoid this problem.
6389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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making this determination; to the application of Katz and its effect
upon fourth amendment protections; to alternatives for the preserva-
tion of fourth amendment rights; and to the necessity for stringent
enforcement of fourth amendment prohibitions.
Katz and the Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment guarantees protection against unreason-
able searches and seizures. 7 Prior to Katz, the determination of fourth
amendment rights involved two central questions. First, was there a
governmental intrusion? Second, if there was an intrusion, was the
area which was invaded one which was constitutionally protected?8
The first question - whether an intrusion had in fact taken
place - was given consideration only in wiretapping cases, and then
only to a limited extent.' But two essential elements of a search and
seizure were set forth in Olmstead v. United States," where fourth
amendment protection was said to apply only where there had been
a physical trespass" and then only if material things had been
seized." In Silverman v. United States,1 these requirements were
liberalized to require an actual intrusion in place of a physical tres-
pass'4 and to include intangibles within the scope of the fourth
amendment.'5
To answer the second question a determination of constitutionally
protected areas was made on an area-by-area basis. In this way a
home,'6 a business office,' 7 a store,' 8 a hotel room, 9 an apartment, 20 an
automobile," and a taxicab2 2 were all determined to be constitutionally
protected areas. In the same manner, it was settled that an open field
7 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8 There is, of course, the third question as to the reasonableness of a search and seizure which
is determined to have taken place in a constitutionally protected area. But the discussion
of this aspect of fourth amendment considerations is outside the scope of this note.
9Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505 (1961).
10277 U.S. 438 (1928)
11 Id. at 464.
12 Id.
'" 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
14 1d.
11ld. at 512.
16 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
17 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
18Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
19 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
20 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
21 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
22 Rios v. United States. 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
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KATZ AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
was not constitutionally protected23 and dicta suggested that a jail
lacked the particular qualities necessary to invoke the protection of
the fourth amendment. 24
It was in this historical context that Katz v. United States2 5 was
decided. The petitioner, Katz, had been convicted of transmitting
wagering information by telephone from Los Angeles to Miami and
Boston, in violation of a federal statute. Evidence introduced at trial
included telephone conversations of the petitioner overheard by F.B.I.
agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device
to the outside of the public telephone booth from which the petitioner
had placed his calls.
The Court seemed to entirely ignore the arguments of the peti-
tioner and the government as to whether a telephone booth could be
a constitutionally protected area.26 The Court indicated that there
were no specific areas which could receive constitutional protection
because the fourth amendment "protects people, not places. '27 Thus,
there are no constitutionally protected areas, only constitutionally
protected people. Therefore, it would seem that the second question,
is the area one which enjoys constitutional protection, was abandoned
under Katz.
But Katz still required an answer to the first question: whether
there was in fact an intrusion which amounted to a search and seizure.
In making this determination in Katz the Court concluded that there
was a "'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment" because the government's activities in electronically listening
to and recording the petitioner's conversations violated "the privacy
upon which he justifiably relied .... 28
Thus, the test which Katz sets forth to be used in determining
when governmental actions constitute a search and seizure is whether
the individual in question justifiably relied upon the privacy which
was invaded.29 This test may be divided into two parts. First, was
23 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
24 Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143-45 (1962).
- 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
26Id. at 349-351.
27 d. at 351.
2Id. at 353.
29 Other "tests" or definitions of searches and seizures typically include the intent of the
government officer and, in regard to searches, some type of exploratory investigation. See
United States v. Haden, 397 F.2d 460, 465 (7th Cit. 1963); Haerr v. United States, 240
F.2d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 1957); United States v. Lodahl, 264 F.Supp. 927, 928 (D.Mont.
1967); United States v. Strickland, 62 F.Supp. 468, 471 (W.D.S.C. 1945); People v.
Eddington, 23 Mich.App. 210, 225, 178 N.W.2d 689, 693 (1970); MODEL CODE OF
PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURES § SS 1.01.
1974)
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there in fact reliance upon privacy? Second, if there was reliance, was
it justifiable? This is essentially the twofold requirement articulated
by Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion:
... first... a person [must] have exhibited an actual (sub-
jective) expectation of privacy and, second, that expectation
[must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as
"reasonable."30
This test is to be applied without regard to the law of trespass be-
cause "the reach of the [Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon the
presence or absence of a physical instrusion in any given area. ' 31
Katz Applied: "A Man's Home Is His Fort"
The reaction of the commentators to Katz was favorable, to say
the least. It was said that "[t]he rationale adopted by the Court is
sound ... 3 and that the decision was
... a correct interpretation of the fourth amendment. It does
nothing more than preserve a person's fourth amendment
right and prevent encroachments by the police ....
Indeed, Katz was said to represent "one of the advancing steps in
the protection of what has been called 'the right of privacy.' " And
Professor Samuel Dash, Director of the Institute of Criminal Law
and Procedure at Georgetown University, found that because Katz
and Berger v. New York 35 had brought electronic surveillance within
the purview of the fourth amendment, they were "landmark decisions,
which should give comfort to a nation of free people."
But it is important to realize that Katz did not merely extend
fourth amendment protection to electronic surveillance. By redefin-
ing the basis upon which it could be said that a search and seizure
had taken place, Katz not only extended fourth amendment protection
to electronic surveillance situations, but also potentially altered all
future applications of fourth amendment rights regarding searches
and seizures.
30 389 U.S. at 361. Justice Harlan's two part test is frequently utilized by courts faced with
fourth amendment issues. See United States v. Abbarno, 342 F.Supp. 599 (W.D.N.Y.
1972); Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa.Super. 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970).
31 389 U.S. at 353.
32 Comment, Eavesdropping, Wiretapping and the Law of Search and Seizure - Some Impli-
cations of the Katz Decision, 9 ARIz. L. REV. 428, 440 (1968).
3 Note, Constitutional Law-Right of Privacy-The Fourth Amendment Protection, 14
LOYOLA L. REV. 370, 377 (1968).
34Comment, Constitutional Law-Electronic Eavesdropping and the Right to Privacy, 70
W.VA.L.REv. 423 (1968).
3s388 U.S. 41 (1967).
36 Dash, Katz- Variations on a Theme by Berger, 17 CATHOLIC U.L.REV. 296, 314 (1968).
[Vol. 23:63
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While it was initially felt that Katz's redefinition would create
a predictable approach to resolving search and seizure questions, in
fact Katz has in some instances created confusion among the courts
faced with deciding fourth amendment search and seizure issues. No-
where is this confusion more evident than in the cases in which gov-
ernment agents have physically intruded into individuals' homes. In
spite of the specific language of the fourth amendment, and long-
established precedent preventing the search of an individual's home
without a search warrant, 7 at least two attempts at applying Katz
to physical intrusions into individuals' homes have resulted in findings
that a physical intrusion into an individual's home did not amount to a
search and seizure.38 Furthermore, the case-by-case approach of de-
termining when a search and seizure has occurred, as introduced by
Katz, has produced numerous conflicts among the various courts as
to whether a particular type of conduct amounts to a fourth amend-
ment violation.39
Nevertheless, while there is confusion in some instances, an an-
alysis of the case law since Katz reveals a general indication that
certain expectations are justifiable. There is a consistent line of de-
cisions finding a justifiable expectation of privacy against physical
intrusions into one's home,40 apartment,4 dormitory room,42 and of-
37 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
3People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 97 Cal.Rptr. 302, 488 P.2d 630 (1971) (since the terms
of probation provided for warrantless "searches," there was no subjective expectation of
privacy against physical entry and hence no search); State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 1
(N.D.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 956 (1971) (since no one was in the house at the time of
entry there was no intrusion upon privacy and hence no search). In a subsequent proceed-
ing the federal district court indicated that it did not find it necessary to comment on North
Dakota's "erroneous interpretation" of Katz. Iverson v. North Dakota, 347 F.Supp. 251,
259 (D.N.D. 1972).
39 For example, compare State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 1 (N.D.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 956
(1971), with United States v. Rubin, 343 F.Supp. 625 (E.D.Pa. 1972) (fourth amend-
ment protection applies to a man's home, even when the house is unoccupied) and People
v. Krivda, 5 Cal.3d 357, 96 Cal.Rptr. 62, 486 P.2d 1262 (1971) (justifiable expectation
of privacy in garbage continues until it has lost its identity by being comingled with other
garbage) and with Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122 (Wyo. 1970) (justifiable expectation of
privacy in garbage ends when it is removed from owner's premises).
40 United States v. Rubin, 343 F.Supp. 625 (E.D.Pa. 1972); contra, People v. Mason, 5 Cal.
3d 759, 97 Cal.Rptr. 302, 488 P.2d 630 (1971) (no subjective expectation of privacy
since the terms of probation provided for warrantless "searches"); State v. Iverson, 187
N.W.2d 1 (N.D.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 956 (1971). In a subsequent proceeding, the
federal district court indicated that it did not find it necessary to comment on North
Dakota's "erroneous interpretation" of Katz. Iverson v. North Dakota, 347 F.Supp. 251,
259 (D.N.D. 1972).
41 See State v. DiBartolo, 13 CR.L. 2100 (La. 1973) (locked apartment building); Brown v.
State, 15 Md. App. 584, 292 A.2d 762 (1972) (rented room in a home); but cf. United
States v. Wilson, 472 F.2d 901 (9th Cit. 1972) (no justifiable expectation of privacy when
the rent was overdue and the door left open); Mercia v. State, 488 P.2d 1161 (Nev. 1971)
(no justifiable expectation of privacy in a screened alcove above heating and air condi-
tioning unit of an apartment).
42Piazolla v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971); Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 217
Pa.Super. 432, 272 A.2d 271 (1970).
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fice . 3 Further, individuals occupying public restrooms are said to
enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy against both physical in-
trusion" and surreptitious surveillance. 4 On the other hand, the
courts have uniformly rejected all claims to a reasonable expectation
of privacy in jails,46 open fields,47 and yards."
While the distinctions are not as clear as in the area of physical
intrusions into individuals' homes, similar generalizations may be
made for other areas. Thus, the courts have determined that there is
a justifiable expectation of privacy in material sent through the
mails,49 items stored in rented lockers, 0 and in the contents of one's
4See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
"Brown v. State, 3 Md. App. 90, 238 A.2d 147 (1968) (police officer stuck his head over
the stall door).
4 5 People v. Metcalf, 22 Cal.App. 3d 20, 98 Cal. Rptr. 925 (1971) (evidence of a public
policy against clandestine observations of public restrooms was found in the state statutes);
State v. Bryant, 177 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 1970) (concealed surveillance through a ceiling
ventilator); Buchanan v. State, 471 S.W. 2d 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (upheld sur-
reptitous surveillance where stalls had no doors, but found it violative of the fourth
amendment where the stalls had doors). But that expectation of privacy can be defeated
by putting restrooms to uses for which they were not intended. United States v. Smith,
293 A.2d 856 (D.C. App. 1972) (two men in one pay stall); Kirsch v. State,
10 Md. App. 565, 271 A.2d 770 (1970) (three men occupying a restroom at a gas
station for over thirty minutes).
"United States v. Hitchcock, 467 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916
(1973) (documents hidden in cell); Haplin v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal. App. 3d 223, 97
Cal. Rptr. 402 (1971), rev'd on other grounds, 6 Cal.3d 885, 101 Cal. Rptr. 375, 495 P.2d
1295 (1972) (telephone conversation); People v. Brooks, 51 Ill. 2d 156, 281 N.E.2d 326
(1972) (conversation overheard). It has been suggested that "strong claims" could be
made that a justifiable expectation of privacy exists, People v. Santos, 26 Cal. App. 3d
397, 102 Cal.Rptr. 678 (1972), especially by an attorney who was working with his
client on a pending case. Haplin v. Superior Court, supra.
47United States v. Pruitt, 464 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1972) (boxes hidden in a clump of
trees in an open field); Patler v. Slayton, 353 F.Supp. 376 (E.D.Va. 1973) (bullets
lodged in a tree in a picnic and play area on a private farm); State v. Stanton, 490 P.2d
1274 (Ore. App. 1971) (marijuana growing in pasture land); Casey v. State, 488
P.2d 1274 (Ore. App. 1971) (surveillance of activity inside fences of a ranch, but over
500 yards from dwelling); see State v. Rocker, 475 P.2d 684 (Hawaii 1970) (nude
sunbathers on a public beach); State v. Borchard, 24 Ohio App. 2d 95, 264 N.E.2d 646
(1970) (nude swimmer on private property).
4People v. Bradley, 1 Cal. 3d 80, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457, 460 P.2d 129 (1969) (marijuana
growing under fig tree near landlord's backdoor and tenant's door); People v. Ortega,
485 P.2d 894 (Colo. 1971) (narcotics hidden in a weeded area behind an apartment
building); contra, Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853 (9th Cit. 1968) (Christmas
trees in the parking lot of the motel where the defendant had his residence).
49Williams v. State, 501 P.2d 841 (Okla. Cr. 1972) (package opened at an airport by
an R.E.A. employee); contra, United States v. Doe, 472 F.2d 982 (2d Cit. 1973) (packet
mailed from a foreign country, purporting to contain non-dutiable goods, was opened);
see United States v. Isaacs, 347 F.Supp. 743 (N.D.Ill. 1972) (upheld mail cover). For
discussion of the use of mail covers, see Gapay, Surveillance of Mail by Investigators
Raises Questions of Abuse, Wall Street Journal, August 28, 1973, at 1 col. 1.
S"United States v. Durkin, 335 F.Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (rented locker at a public
terminal); United States v. Small, 297 F.Supp. 582 (D.Mass. 1969) (rented locker at a
public terminal); People v. Baker, 12 Cal.App. 835, 96 Cal.Rptr. 760 (1970) (rented
(locker issued to police officer); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.2d 895 (Ky.App.
1971) (locker issued to police officer).
[Vol. 23 :63
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garbage containers.5 ' But "reasonable" expectations of privacy do
not extend to abandoned property, s" goods under bailment to another,5 3
or items which have been sold. 4 The decisions also conclude that there
exists no expectation of privacy, which society would deem reason-
able, in the financial records of a company in bankruptcy,55 the records
of long-distance phone calls,5 6 the vehicle identification number of an
automobile, 7 or an attorney's social security number. 8
The courts agree that there is no fourth amendment protection
against visual intrusions into dwellings or other buildings.5 9 More-
over, the conduct of looking into a building will not be changed into
51 People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62, 486 P.2d 1262 (1971); People v.
Edwards, 71 Cal.2d 1096, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633, 458 P.2d 713 (1969); Croker v. State,
477 P.2d 122 (Wyo. 1970). But cf. United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 972 (1st Cir.
1972) (item placed in trash barrel of another person); United States v. Jackson, 448
F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 924 (1972) (item placed in public
trash can motel hallway); United States v. Stroble, 431 F.2d 1263 (6th Cir. 1970)
item lying outside of garbage can); United States v. Haruff, 352 F.Supp. 224 (E.D. Mich.
1972) (item placed in community pick-up trash can of apartment complex); People v.
Sirhan, 7 Cal.3d 710, 102 Cal.Rptr. 385, 497 P.2d 1121 (1972) (item lying outside
of trash can); People v. Superior Ct., 23 Cal.App.3d 1004, 100 Cal.Rptr. 604 (1972)
(item placed in trash can of neighbor who had previously given consent for the use of the
trash can); Robinson v. State, 13 Md. App. 439, 283 A.2d 637 (1971) (item placed in
trash can in public restroom).
32United States v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1971) (automobile abandoned during
chase); United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1973) (brief cases which
defendants claimed did not belong to them); see United States v. Abbarno, 342 F.Supp.
599 (W.D.N.Y. 1972) (items locked in a room not covered by the original lease,
after the lease had expired); People v. Maltz, 14 Cal.App. 3d 371, 92 Cal.Rptr. 216
(1971) (contraband in a hole in the garage of another person).
s3Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (tax records given to an accountant);
Nelson v. Moore, 470 F.2d 1192 (5th Cit. 1972) (vacuum cleaner pipes loaned to a
neighbor); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.2d 895 (Ky.App. 1971) (goods stored
at a furniture store); State v. Howe, 182 N.W.2d 658 (N.D. 1970) (clothing left
at a cleaners); State v. Edwards, 490 P.2d 1337 (Wash.App. 1973) (suitcase left in
house of another).
4 Brown v. Brierley, 438 F.2d 954 (3d Cit. 1971) (ballistics test made on a gun sold
to a police officer).
5 Kroll v. United States, 433 F.2d 1282 (5th Cit. 1970).
56United States v. Fithian, 452 F.2d 205 (9th Cit. 1971).
57 United States v. Powers, 439 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1011 (1971);
United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Johnson, 431 F.2d
441 (5th Cir. 1970). But it has been suggested that stopping an automobile to inspect its
vehicle identification number may be an intrusion upon the personal privacy of the driver.
United States v. Polk, supra.
"Cantor v. Supreme Ct., 353 F.Supp. 1307 (E.D.Pa. 1973).
"
9United States v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cit. 1971) (nine inch gap between the
doors of a garage); United States v. Hanahan, 442 F.2d 649 (7th Cit. 1971) (uncovered
garage window); United States v. Vilhotti, 323 F.Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. (1971)
afl'd in part, 425 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir. 1971) (gaps between boards covering
garage window); Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621 (9th Cit. 1969) (open bathroom
window in motel); People v. Berutko, 71 Cal. 89, 77 Cal. Rptr. 89, 77 Cal. Rptr. 217,
453 P.2d 721 (1969) (aperture in curtains over window); People v. McGahey, 500
P.2d 977 (Colo. 1972) (uncovered front window); State v. Clarke, 242 So.2d 791
(Fla. App. 1970) (uncovered window open to view from fire escape); see United States
v. Elder, 446 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1971) (tent); contra, Texas v. Gonzales, 388 F.2d
145 (5th Cir. 1968) (side and back windows of a house); Lorenzana v. Superior Ct.,
(Continued on next page)
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a search and seizure simply because of the use of binoculars 60 or arti-
ficial light.61 In spite of conflict in other areas, the concensus of opinion
is that there is no justifiable expectation of privacy against eaves-
dropping.62 Further, though Katz demonstrated that there is a pro-
tectable expectation of privacy against electronic eavesdropping,6 the
Supreme Court has determined that such an expectation does not
exist where one party to the overheard conversation gives his consent
to such eavesdropping."
A careful comparison of the preceding cases with the purpose
of the fourth amendment raises serious doubt as to how much "com-
fort" Katz in fact gives Mr. Dash's "nation of free people." Mr. Justice
Stewart, writing for the majority in Silverman, pointed out that at the
very core of the fourth amendment "stands the right of a man to
retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable in-
trusion. ' 65 Justice Stewart did not describe the kind of house one
would be required to own in order to enjoy that freedom from intru-
sion, but that information is provided by the courts which have ap-
plied Katz.
To begin with, such a house would have to be isolated, away from
both the street 66 and the proximity of other houses.67 If the house
were to have windows, they could not be left uncovered without
(Continued from preceding page)
13 CR.L. 2338 (Cal. 1973) (gap in curtains of side window); Pate v. Municipal Ct.,
11 Cal. App. 3d 721, 89 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1970) (officer peered through gap in motel
window curtains from a trellis); People v. Myles, 6 Cal. App. 3d 788, 86 Cal. Rptr. 274
(1970) (officer peered through a gap in motel window curtains from a ledge); Common-
wealth v. Soychak, 221 Pa. Super. 458, 289 A.2d 119 (1972) (looking through restroom
ventilator from roof of pool hall).
60 48 A.L.R. 3d Observation Through Binoculars as Constituting Unreasonable Search, 1178,
1181, collects the cases on binoculars used in searches.
61 United States v. Wickizer, 465 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Brooker,
461 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir.
1971); United States v. Hanahan, 442 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1971); State v. Stone, 294
A.2d 683 (Me. 1972); see United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927); People v. Maltz,
14 Cal.App.3d 381, 92 Cal.Rptr. 216 (1971).
62Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1969) (listening through motel door from
hallway); United States v. lanes, 398 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1038 (1968) (listening through improperly hung apartment door from public hallway);
United States v. Perry, 339 F.Supp. 209 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (listening through interconnect-
ing doors between motel rooms); People v. Foster, 19 Cal. 3d 649, 97 Cal. Rptr. 94 (listening
through apartment door from hallway); People v. Todd, 26 Cal. App.3d 15, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 539 (1972) (recording conversations of suspects who were alone in police car);
People v. Guerra, 21 Cal. App. 532, 98 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1971) (listening by placing
ear against apartment door); Ray v. United States, 288 A.2d 239 (D.C. App. 1972)
(listening from adjoining apartment room); see United States v. Fuller, 441 F.2d 755
761 (4th Cir. 1971) (telephone booth); contra, United States v. Case, 435 F.2d 766
(7th Cir. 1970) (government agents eavesdropping from area not open to the public).
- 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
6United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
65365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
6See People v. Maltz, 14 Cal. App.3d 381, 92 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1971).
67 See People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal.3d 710. 102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 497 P.2d 1121 (1972).
[Vol. 23:•63
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol23/iss1/35
KATZ AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
abandoning fourth amendment protection. 8 It would not be enough
to merely construct windows that no one could see through from the
ground level, because ladders or adjoining structures could be used
as observation points.69 Nor would it be possible to make any provision
for sunlight by openings or windows in the roof, because of the pos-
sibility of using a helicopter as a means of observation.
70
Even an extensive area of land surrounding the house would not
prevent government agents from trespassing onto the land and peep-
ing through the windows, because the fourth amendment prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures, not trespasses. 1 Furthermore,
agents could survey the house from positions off the premises by
making use of telescopes and binoculars.
72
Thus it becomes clear that the windows must be covered. But
curtains would not be enough, because any opening, no matter how
small or how inadvertant, would destroy any hopes of maintaining a
reasonable expectation of privacy.7 3 Even boarding up the windows
would not be protection enough, because any small crack could be
considered an invitation for agents to peek into the house.7 4 None
of this would change, of course, simply because of darkness. There
could be no opening of the gates, nor uncovering of the windows, be-
cause the surveillance could continue with the use of artificial light.
75
Apparently, the only way to maintain privacy would be to construct
a windowless house.
However, even though the house may be windowless, there is
still the problem of the door, which must be perfectly hung. 76 Further-
more, the entire house, including the door, must be soundproof, be-
cause any noise or conversations that could be heard from outside,
even by placing one's ear against different parts of the house, would
not be protected. 7
68 See, e.g., Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1969); Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216
Pa.Super. 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970).
69 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa. Super. 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970); People v.
Cooper, 17 Cal. App. 3d 1112, 95 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1971).
70 See Commonwealth v. Colello, 272 N.E.2d 874 (Mass. 1971).
71 People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 365, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62, 67, 486 P.2d 1262, 1267 (1971),
citing People v. Terry, 70 Cal.2d 410, 427, 77 Cal. Rptr. 460, 472, 454 P.2d 36, 48
(1969). See People v. Edwards, 71 Cal.2d 1096, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633, 458 P.2d 713 (1969).
72 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa.Super. 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970).
73See People v. Berutko, 71 Cal. 89, 77 Cal.Rptr. 217, 453 P.2d 721 (1969).
74 See United States v. Hanahan, 442 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1971).
75 See, e.g., United States v. Wickizer, 465 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Brooker, 461 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1135 (D.C. Cir.
1971); United States v. Hanahan, 442 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1971); State v. Stone, 294
A.2d 683 (Me. 1972); see United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927); People v. Maltz,
14 Cal. App.3d 381, 92 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1971).
76 See United States v. Llanes, 398 F.2d 880 (2d Cit. 1968); cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1032
(1968).
77 See People v. Guerra, 21 Cal. App.3d 534, 98 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1971).
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Finally, the house could never be left empty without abandoning
fourth amendment protection, 7 and the inhabitant of the house might
well be required to live alone in order to maintain his expectation
of privacy.79
Thus, we have the specter of a fourth amendment which protects
any man who retreats into his home to be free from unreasonable
intrusion. Any man, that is, who is wealthy enough to afford a win-
dowless, soundproof house, built on an extensive area of land, and
surrounded by high fences, 0 and a man who is willing to live the
life of a hermit, staying inside his house at all times, prepared to
take affirmative action to counter any new technological methods of
intrusion with which the government might be equipped.
Alternatives to Life in a Fort
Neither Katz nor the fourth amendment requires life in a fort
in order to preserve one's security against arbitrary governmental
intrusion. There are a number of alternatives by which the privacy
and security guaranteed under the Constitution can be safeguarded.
These alternatives include the recognition of a constitutionally-pro-
tected general right of privacy; the use of an objective emphasis in
determining whether there exists a justifiable expectation of privacy;
recognition that different expectations of privacy may be justifiable
in regard to different classes of people, and different types of intru-
sions; and the stringent enforcement of the limitations of the Plain
View Doctrine.
A General Right of Privacy
It is at least arguable that there is in fact a general right of
privacy guaranteed by the Constitution that prohibits much of the
surreptitious surveillance which has been appoved in the name of
Katz. Although Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Katz,
expressed the opinion that there is no general right of privacy guar-
anteed by the Constitution, 1 this disclaimer is questionable.
In the recent abortion decision, 2 Mr. Justice Blackmun collected
the cases dealing with the right of privacy, indicating that the court
or individual Justices had found at least the roots of a right of
7See State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d I (N.D. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 956 (1971).
79 See People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal.3d 710, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 497 P.2d 1121 (1972).
8o For a discussion of the maldistribution of privacy and the benefits of social status and
wealth in obtaining immunity from unwanted official surveillance, see Katz, Patterns of
Arrest and the Dangers of Public Visibility, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 311 (1973).
8 389 U.S. at 350-351.
2 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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privacy in the first amendment,83 the fourth and fifth amendments,8 4
in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights," in the ninth amendment,8 6 and
in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the four-
teenth amendment.8 7
It seems rather anomalous that the unwritten, unspoken right
of privacy is pervasive enough to extend constitutional protection to
marriage,8 8 procreation, 89 , contraception,98 a woman's decision on the
termination of a pregnancy, 91 family relationships, 92 and childrearing
and education, 3 but lacks the potency to protect the right of a family
to be free from surreptitious surveillance in its own home. Indeed, it
is questionable whether these aspects of personal privacy involving
family life do in fact enjoy meaningful protection when government
agents, without cause, without reason, and without prior judicial
supervision, can intrude upon the privacy of any home and place such
home and family life under arbitrary surveillance at their whim.
This anamoly recalls the words of Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for
five members of the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut :94
Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of
marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contra-
ceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy
surrounding the marriage relationship.95
But marital bedrooms have windows through which conversations
can be overheard, and curtains susceptible to apertures through which
government agents can peer.
Clearly, a constitutional right of privacy which has the power
to protect the many family functions catalogued in Roe v. Wade
96
8MId. at 152, citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
84410 U.S. at 152, citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); see Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
1s410 U.S. at 152, citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-485 (1965).
86410 U.S. at 152, citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg,
J., concurring).
67410 U.S. at 152, citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1927).
88See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
89 See generally Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-542 (1942).
90 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 461-464 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
1 Roe v. Wade, 110 U.S. 113, 152-156 (1973).
92 See generally Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944).
93See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
94381 U.S. 479 (1965).
9s Id. at 485-86.
96410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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must also have the power to provide that family with security from
peeping, eavesdropping government agents. As the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire has concluded:
If the peeping Tom, the big ear and the electronic eaves-
dropper (whether ingenious or ingenuous) have a place in
the hierarchy of social values, it ought not to be at the ex-
pense of a married couple minding their own business in the
seclusion of their bedroom .... 97
An Objective Emphasis
When faced with an allegation that an illegal search and seizure
has taken place, there are two approaches that the courts have taken.
The first has been to determine whether government conduct did in
fact constitute a search and seizure. The second approach has been to
assume that a search and seizure has taken place, and to determine
whether it was reasonable. 98 It is this first approach in which the
Katz test was designed to operate and it is this approach which de-
serves detailed consideration.
The cases which determine whether governmental conduct con-
stitutes a search and seizure can be divided into two categories: those
which utilize an objective emphasis and those which utilize a sub-
jective emphasis. 99 For purposes of definition, it may be said that
the objective emphasis approach is one in which it is decided or as-
sumed that the aggrieved party had an actual expectation of privacy;
the inquiry of the court is then whether that expectation was justi-
fiable. The subjective emphasis approach is one in which the primary
inquiry of the court is whether the aggrieved party had an actual,
subjective expectation of privacy without considering whether the
expectation was justifiable.
The Subjective Emphasis Approach
Those courts that employ the subjective emphasis approach have
taken different avenues in determining whether the aggrieved party
had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy. However, even
though the courts have taken different avenues, each of the different
avenues is problematic in that each has yielded unrealistic results.
91 Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 242 (N.H. 1964).
"This approach was taken in United States v. Vilhotti, 323 F.Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
and People v. Maltz, 14 Cal. App. 3d 381, 92 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1971). See United States v.
Brooker, 461 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Wickizer, 465 F.2d 1154 (8th
Cit. 1972). The fallacy in such an approach is that the test of a "justifiable expectation
of privacy" was not designed to determine the reasonableness of a search and seizure,
but to answer the prior question of whether there was any search and seizure at all.
" Divided in this manner, there are forty-one cases which use the objective approach and
fifty-two which follow the subjective approach. The cases in each category are too numerous
to list, but examples are included in the textual discussion which follows.
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One avenue taken by the courts has been to make an objective
determination as to the existence of a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy. 10 In State v. Clarke,101 for example, police officers had mounted
a fire escape directly outside the defendant's second floor apartment
for purposes of looking through the defendant's window. The court,
in finding that there was no actual expectation of privacy, stated that
other tenants had the right to use the fire escape and that:
Those inside the apartment must be held to an expectation
that those using the common facilities of the building would
come across the window and look inside.102
The obvious problem with this approach is that the court is sup-
posedly using a subjective standard for determining whether the ag-
grieved party had an expectation of privacy; but in fact, the court
by using an objective avenue to a supposedly subjective approach, is
effectively using an objective approach overall.
Another difficulty arises when the court's determination as to
the existence of a subjective expectation of privacy conflicts with the
aggrieved party's actual expectation of privacy. In People v. Sirhan0 3
the defendant was held to have no expectation of privacy in an
envelope that was found lying in a box of trash in his back yard. The
reasons given for this lack of expectation of privacy were twofold.
First, the mother and brother of the defendant were living in the same
house and undoubtedly went into the back yard.10 4 Second, there were
houses on either side of the house in which the defendant lived, and
these houses were in close proximity. 0 5 Not only is it likely that there
was a contrary actual expectation in Sirhan, but if its criteria were
applied to everyone, it is questionable whether anyone in an urban
area could possibly demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy.
A third problem with the subjective approach is that it focuses
the court's inquiry upon the specific point at which an individual's
privacy is invaded. The problem is that it fails to give consideration
to the individual's total efforts in attempting to maintain his privacy.
An example of the problem created by this approach can be seen in
People v. Berutko,16 where a police officer obtained evidence which
provi:_' the basis for the arrest of the defendant, by peering through
100 This determination is made by the court because the issue is raised in a suppression hearing.
101 242 So.2d 791 (Fla.App. 1970).
102 Id. at 794.
1037 Cal. 3d 710, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385,497 P.2d 1121 (1972).
1 4 Id. at 742-43, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 403, 497 P.2d at 1143.
105 d.
10671 Cal. 2d 84, 77 Cal. Rptr. 217, 453 P.2d 721 (1969).
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a small aperture in the curtains that were covering the defendant's
apartment window. The court emphasized the failure of the defendant
to close the curtains completely, finding that when
... a person by his own action or neglect allows visual access
to his residence by providing an aperture adjacent to a com-
mon area, he may not complain that police officers who were
lawfully present in that area have utilized that aperture to
detect the commission of crime within. 107
It was of no importance that the defendant was in his own apart-
ment, at his own table, with his door shut and his curtains drawn.
Nor did it matter that an individual walking by- or even walking
up to the window without crouching down- could not have seen
through the window. What was of importance was that there existed
an aperture through which several square inches of the interior of
the apartment could be seen when the officer stooped to peek through
the window.1 0
A fourth problem with the subjective approach is that it
nearly always contains an unspoken presumption that the defend-
ant has no expectation of privacy; this places the burden of rebutting
that presumption upon the defendant. Thus, courts following this ap-
proach are concerned with whether the defendant has "exhibited a
reasonable expectation of privacy,"10 9 has taken actions "calculated"
to keep his possessions private,11 0 has made efforts "to insure" the
privacy of a given area,"' or has "taken reasonable steps" to keep
conversations and transactions private.112
The dangers of a presumption that the defendent has no expec-
tation of privacy are readily apparent from a reading of Common-
wealth v. Hernley.113 A government agent wanted to look through
windows of a certain printing firm to determine whether illegal foot-
ball gambling forms were being printed there; however, he faced
the particular problem that the windows of the building in which the
firm was located were so constructed that from the ground level out-
side, neither he nor anyone else could see through the windows. His
07 Id. at 95, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 222, 453 P.2d at 726.
108ld.
109People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 497 P.2d 1121 (1972); Pate v.
Municipal Ct., 11 Cal. App. 3d 721, 724, 89 Cal. Rptr. 893, 895 (1970); see Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
10United States v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1355, 1364 (D.C. Cit. 1971).
111 United States v. Vilhotti, 323 F.Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) af/'d in part, 452 F.2d 1186
(2d Cir. 1971).
112United States v. Case, 435 F.2d 766, 768 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v. Haden, 397
F.2d 460, 465 (7th Cir. 1968).
113 Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa.Super. 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970).
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solution to this problem was to use binoculars, during the night, to
look through the windows from a vantage point on top of a ladder
which had been placed on a railroad grade behind the print shop.
In spite of the construction of the windows, the court placed the
burden of establishing a desire for privacy upon the defendant, find-
ing that it was "incumbent upon the suspect to preserve his privacy
from visual observation."11 4 It was not enough that the agent's initial
attempt at peering through the windows was defeated by their con-
struction, for the court found that since the windows were not cur-
tained and since the agent was ultimately able to penetrate the
privacy offered by the building, the defendant had indicated that he
had "little regard for his privacy." ' 5
A fifth difficulty is the application of what might be called the
"persistent policeman" rule; that is, unless the defendant takes
enough precautions to defeat the attempted intrusions of a persistent
policeman, the defendant had no actual, subjective expectation of pri-
vacy. In People v. Guerra,116 for example, the police suspected Guerra
had a "stash pad" and that several people would go there at night to
cut up heroin. On learning that someone was in the apartment, police
officers went to the building and entered the hallway that led to
Guerra's door, but from their location in the public hallway, the police
officers were unable to "understand what was being said inside .... ,,1117
Having been frustrated in their attempt to overhear the conversa-
tions, one of the officers placed his ear to the door and was able to
overhear at least part of the conversation.
Under these circumstances, the court concluded that there was
no subjective expectation of privacy because
... if an individual desires that his speech remains private,
he can easily assure himself of privacy by whispering, so that
even a person in [the officer's] position cannot hear him."1
Carried to its logical conclusions, such an approach would mean that
the success of an intrusion in gaining evidence or information would
itself establish that there was no subjective expectation of privacy.
A sixth problem with the subjective approach is that it can be
logically extended to defeat all fourth amendment protections. The
argument is simple enough. There can be no subjective expectation
of privacy if it is announced in advance that surveillance or an in-
spection is to be conducted. If there is no subjective expectation of
114 Id. at 907.
I's Id.
'
1 6 People v. Guerra, 21 Cal. App. 3d 534, 98 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1971).
"
71d. at 537, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
"' People v. Guerra, 21 Cal. App. 3d 534, 538, 98 Cal. Rptr. 627, 629 (1971).
1974]
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1974
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
privacy, then there is no intrusion upon privacy and hence no search
and seizure. Thus, by proclamation, announcement, or posted sign,
the subjective expectation of privacy could be discounted at the whim
of government officials.
The germ of this type approach can be found in at least three of
the cases which have applied Katz to issues of search and seizure. In
People v. Mason119 the defendant's terms of probation included the
stipulation that he would be subject to warrantless search at any time.
Under these conditions, the court determined that he could have no
subjective expectation of privacy that would make the subsequent
warrantless search illegal.12 0 While the resulting decision is no de-
parture from other decisions regarding the rights of probationers,
what is significant is that the court grounded its decision on the lack
of a subjective expectation of privacy on the part of the defendant,
and paid scarce attention to the more traditional approaches of deter-
mining a probationer's rights."'
A similar lack of an actual expectation of privacy was found in
Wilson v. Commonwealth,12 2 wherein it was said that a policeman who
was suspended from the department had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the locker that had been assigned to him by the police de-
partment. Among the reasons given to show that the defendant had
no expectation of privacy were the facts that all the policemen under-
stood that the department had the right to inspect the lockers, that
the right of the department to inspect lockers had been explained in
recruiting school, and that the defendant knew that when he left the
police force, the contents of his locker had to be removed immediately.123
Of even greater concern is State v. Bryant, 24, wherein it was
found that there existed an actual expectation of privacy in regard
to doored enclosures in a public restroom; however, the court suggested
that this actual expectation of privacy could be defeated and that sur-
reptitious surveillance would be constitutionally permissible if signs
were posted "warning anyone using the facilities that they were apt
to be under surveillance. '1 25 Though this particular application of
Katz has been developed no further, it is perhaps the one application
which offers not only possibility of abuse, but also the potential demise
of the fourth amendment.
1195 Cal.3d 759, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302, 488 P.2d 630 (1971).
'
20 d. at 765, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 305, 488 P.2d at 633.
121 Id.
1-475 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. App. 1971).
12 Id. at 898.
124287 Minn. 205, 177 N.W.2d 800 (1970).
12S1d. at 211, 177 N.W.2d at 804.
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The Objective Emphasis Approach
The objective approach is by far the better test. This is not to
say that it is not subject to abuse, or that there have not been ques-
tionable decisions under the objective approach. It does, however,
eliminate the specific abuses which have occurred under the subjec-
tive approach and offers a more predictable standard by which fourth
amendment rights can be measured.
Furthermore, it would appear that it was the objective approach
which was enunciated by the Supreme Court in Katz. Indeed, Mr.
Justice White, writing for the majority in United States v. White, 126
interpreted Katz in the following way:
Our problem is not what the privacy expectations of par-
ticular defendants in particular situations may be .... Our
problem, in terms of the principle announced in Katz, is
what expectations of privacy are constitutionally "justifi-
able" - what expectations the Fourth Amendment will pro-
tect in the absence of a warrant.127
This objective approach, with a presumed subjective expectation of
privacy and a focus upon the issue of the justifiability of that ex-
pectation, was taken by the Supreme Court in Mancusi v. DeForte,2 8
wherein it was determined that there was a justifiable expectation of
privacy in papers kept in an office shared with other employees. What
is most significant about Mancusi is that the court had the oppor-
tunity to use the subjective approach and chose not to. The argument
that there was no subjective expectation of privacy could have been
based on several grounds: the papers did not belong to DeForte, but
to the union for which he worked; DeForte's superiors had not only
access to but control over the documents; and the office in which the
papers were seized was shared by DeForte with a number of other
individuals, all of whom could have examined the documents. Though
arguments for the subjective approach appear to have been raised by
the government, the court chose to ignore them and focus its atten-
tion upon the nature of privacy that can justifiably be expected in
any office.129
Two logical corollaries to the objective emphasis approach are
the doctrine of constitutionally protected areas and the trespass doc-
trine. Each is an objective form of determining fourth amendment
violations and each could have a substantial impact upon the preser-
vation of fourth amendment rights.
126401 U.S. 745 (1971).
127ld. at 751.
128392 U.S. 364 (1968).
129 These facts and arguments are discussed id. at 367-370.
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Katz did not specifically overrule Silverman,130 nor did the court
in Katz indicate that the use of the concept of constitutionally pro-
tected areas was to be abandoned. What Katz did say was that the
phrase "constitutionally protected areas" did not necessarily promote
a correct solution to fourth amendment problems,131 that the court
had never suggested that the concept could "serve as a talismanic
solution to every fourth amendment problem,"13 and that the fourth
amendment protects "people - and not simply places." Implicit in
each statement is the potential that the concept of constitutionally
protected areas may still serve a useful function, that it does promote
correct solutions to fourth amendment problems in some instances,
that it is in itself a solution to at least some fourth amendment prob-
lems, and that in addition to protecting persons, the fourth amend-
ment also encompasses the right of those persons to have places
protected from arbitrary governmental intrusion.
The continued vitality of the "constitutionally protected areas"
doctrine can be argued from a number of grounds. It has been utilized
in at least four post-Katz decisions.13 Though not by name, it seems
to have been applied by the Supreme Court in Mancusi,13 wherein
the court first indicated that there would be standing to challenge the
search of a hypothetical private office and then concluded that "...
the situation was not fundamentally changed because DeForte shared
an office with other union officials.1' 36 In interpreting Katz, the court
indicated that fourth amendment protections depend upon "whether
the area was one in which there was a reasonable expectation of free-
dom from government intrusion.
137
Furthermore, since the "open fields" doctrine appears to be a
conceptual corollary of the concept of constitutionally protected
areas, the decisions attesting to the continued importance of Hester
v. United States1" add credibility to the argument that constitutionally
protected areas is still a viable concept.
139
130365 U.S. 505 (1961).
131 389 U.S. at 350.
132Id. at 351, n. 9.
'3Id. at 353.
134People v. Foster, 19 Cal.3d 649, 97 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1971); State v. Stone, 294 A.2d 683
(Me. 1972); Brown v. State, 15 Md. App. 584, 292 A.2d 762 (1972); Robinson v.
State, 13 Md. App. 439, 283 A.2d 637 (1971).
135392 U.S. 364 (1968).
136 Id. at 369.
137Id. at 368.
'3265 U.S. 57 (1924).
139People v. Ortega, 485 P.2d 894, 896 (Colo. 1971); Casey v. State, 488 P.2d 546, 547
(Nev. 1971); see Cady v. Dombrowski, 13 CR. L. 3231, 3236 (U.S. 1973); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Patler v. Slayton,
353 F.Supp. 376, 387 (E.D.Va. 1973); State v. Borchard, 24 Ohio App.2d 95, 96-97, 264
N.E.2d 646, 648 (1970).
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The continued use of the constitutionally protected areas concept
would have at least two benefits. First, it would offer stability and
certainty in search and seizure cases involving physical entry into
areas which have previously been determined to enjoy fourth amend-
ment protection. Second, in search and seizure cases not involving
physical entry, the concept could be used to establish a rebuttable pre-
sumption of reasonableness in expecting privacy in a given area.
There is also dispute as to whether Katz determined that a tres-
pass does not always constitute a search, or only that a trespass is not
necessary to a search.14 It has been suggested that the matter was
left open by the court, 141 but there is also authority to the contrary,
holding that Katz did not overturn the rule that "evidence is inad-
missible because obtained by a physical trespass or actual intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area.' '142
Under either view it is possible to argue that any evidence gained
as a result of a trespass is inadmissible. Such an approach would offer
greater and more predictable fourth amendment protection, reaffirm-
ing the traditional protections against physical entry into dwellings
and re-establishing certain protected areas against eavesdropping and
searches by peep.
Different Expectations of Privacy
It has been suggested in a number of cases that activity by gov-
ernment agents was justified because they were simply doing what
any private citizen would be permitted to do.143 Such a justification is
untenable for a number of reasons.
First, it is highly questionable whether private citizens could,
without incurring tort liability, engage in window peeping or eaves-
dropping.1 " Furthermore, the conduct of private citizens is not the
standard by which police conduct is to be measured. The requirements
of the fourth amendment are "independent of and superior to the
federal or state statutory or common law of torts and crimes .... ,,4
14OUnited States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644, 647, n. 1 (5th Cir. 1970). The statements of the
Supreme Court regarding the affect of trespasses on fourth admendment protections,
including the conclusion that fourth amendment protections do not turn upon the
"presence or absence" of a physical intrusion, are set forth in Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-353.
141 United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644, n. 1 (5th Cit. 1970); 82 HARv.L.REV. 63 (1968).
In light of this opinion, the Fifth Circuit chose to abandon the trespass rule and allow
the concept of a reasonable expectation of privacy "its full scope."
142 Brown v. State, 3 Md.App. 90, 238 A.2d 147 n. 3 (1968).
14 See, e.g., People v. Berutko, 71 Cal. 89, 77 Cal. Rptr. 217, 453 P.2d 721 (1969).
144 See The Plain View Doctrine, infra.
145 MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §SS 1.01, note.
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Indeed, the prohibitions of the fourth amendment are specifically de-
signed to prevent governmental intrusion.'
Second, an individual may be entitled to have different expecta-
tions of privacy with respect to different classes of people. It has
been suggested, for example, that while a person may have no expec-
tation of privacy against children playing in his backyard, he may
nonetheless be entitled to expect privacy against policemen conduct-
ing a dragnet search of a whole neighborhood. 147 Similarly, students
who have no expectation of privacy against an inspection of their
rooms pursuant to university regulations do have a justifiable expec-
tation of privacy against an intrusion made for the purpose of ob-
taining evidence in a criminal investigation. 14
Third, even as to the same individual, there may be different but
justifiable expectations of privacy with respect to different types of
intrusions. This was the position taken in Katz, wherein it was in-
dicated that even though the petitioner was visible and subject to
visual observation, he was still protected against the uninvited ear,
which he sought to exclude. 49
The determination of fourth amendment rights would be enhanced
if it were recognized that the prohibitions are against governmental
intrusions, that there are justifiable differences in expectations of
privacy with respect to different classes of individuals, and that even
as to the same person, there are justifiable expectations of privacy
which differ according to the type of intrusion.
The Plain View Doctrine
The "plain view doctrine," simply stated, provides that objects
falling into the plain view of a police officer are subject to seizure and
may be introduced in evidence. s0 The limitations on the plain view
l4 E.g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293, 301 (1966); Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 217 Pa.Super. 432, 272 A.2d 271,
273 (1970).
141State v. Stanton, 490 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Ore. App. 1971).
148Piazolla v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971); Commonwealth v. McCloskey,
217 Pa.Super. 432, 272 A.2d 271 (1970).
14 389 U.S. at 352.
150Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968). The cases which have applied Katz
to fourth amendment issues have made a number of assumptions concerning the plain
view doctrine. These include: (1) the plain view doctrine applies to information that is
heard as well as to information that is seen; (2) both the aural and visual gathering of
information can constitute a "search and seizure" within the plain view doctrine; (3)
the statement of Katz at 351-"What a person knowingly exposes to the public ... is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection..." has no independent signficance and
is merely a restatement of the plain view doctrine. These same assumptions will be
made in the discussion to follow, since the resolution of the issues involved is beyond
the scope of this note.
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doctrine are two in number. First, the officer must have the right to
be in the area from which he obtains the view.151 Second, the dis-
covery of the evidence must be inadvertent.1 2
While the plain view doctrine has been widely used 1 3 in conjunc-
tion with the Katz test to determine whether a search and seizure has
taken place, 154 such an approach is often inappropriate because the
"inadvertence" requirement is not met. For example, it can hardly be
argued that an officer on his hands and knees, rummaging among the
trash with his flashlight in hand, has inadvertently discovered cap-
sules containing LSD.155 Nor can it be argued that a policeman who
had driven to a specified house, pulled into the driveway, and pur-
posely looked through a window to check the validity of an informant's
tip that marijuana was being grown in a planter inside the house,
has inadvertently discovered contraband.156
The other limitation on the plain view doctrine is that the of-
ficer must have the right to be in the area from which he obtains the
view.157 It seems clear that in cases involving technical or actual tres-
pass,'5 visual intrusions,15 and non-electronic eavesdropping,16 0 law
enforcement officers have no right to be in positions from which they
gather incriminating information.
That the law enforcement officers do not have the right to
be in positions from which they can gather incriminating informa-
tion by means of technical or actual trespass, visual intrusion, or
non-electronic eavesdropping seems clear from a study of the develop-
ing law in the area of the right to privacy. A trespass gives rise to
an action in tort, even through no actual damage was suffered.1 61 At
l51 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S.
234, 236 (1968).
12 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971).
15 People v. Maltz, 14 Cal. App. 3d 381, 92 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1971); People v. McGahey,
500 P.2d 977 (Colo. 1972); State v. Stanton, 490 P.2d 1274 (Ore. App. 1971).
l'4 But see Brown v. State, 15 Md. App. 584, 292 A.2d 762 (1972) for an example of the
confusion, in the area of the plain view doctrine, which as occured subsequent to the
Katz decision.
155 People v. Maltz, 14 Cal. App. 3d 381, 92 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1971).
156 People v. McGahey, 500 P.2d 977 (Colo. 1972).
157Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971); Harris v. United States, 390
U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
1-" State v. Borchard, 24 Ohio App.2d 95, 264 N.E.2d 646 (1970); State v. Stanton, 490
P.2d 1274 (Ore. App. 1971); see People v. Maltz, 14 Cal. App.3d 381, 92 Cal. Rptr.
216 (1971).
"s
9 People v. Berutko, 71 Cal. 89, 77 Cal. Rptr. 217, 453 P.2d 721 (1969); People v.
McGahey, 500 P.2d 979 (Colo. 1972); State v. Clarke, 242 So.2d 791 (Fla. App. 1970).
160 Ray v. United States, 288 A.2d 239 (D.C. App. 1972).
16 1 W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 13 (4th ed. 1971).
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common law, eavesdropping was a nuisance and an indictable of-
fense.16 2 It is prohibited by criminal statute in at least five states,
16
and by the right of privacy which is guaranteed by constitution or
statute in four other states. 16 Furthermore, in modern tort law eaves-
dropping gives rise to an action for interference with privacy, 165 or
more specifically, an action for intrusion upon seclusion. 166 Such an
action would lie irrespective of an actual or technical trespass since
it is independent of "common rights of property, contract, reputation,
and physical integrity.1 67 The tort of intrusion upon seclusion also
includes peeping into windows. 16 Such conduct is further prohibited
by the guarantees of a general right of privacy in four states169 and
by criminal statutes in at least thirteen states. 170
Thus, many of the cases invoking the plain view doctrine - in-
cluding a number of cases which do not do so by name- cannot
comply with the requirement that police officers have a right to be
in the areas from which they obtained their view. Perhaps this stems
162Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45 (1968); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,
466 (1963) (Warren, C. J., concurring); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, * 168.
163GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2002 (Harrison Supp. 1968); N. D. CENT. CODE §12-42-05
(Smith Supp. 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1202 (West 1958); S. C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-554 (Michie 1962) (§ 16-555 states that § 16-554 shall not be interpreted to dimin-
ish the existing powers of law enforcement officers); S. D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.
§22-21-1 (Smith 1967).
164 ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 8; HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 5; ILL. CONST. art I, § 6; ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 41-1426 (1947).
16S RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (Tent. Draft No. 13 1967). There have been
over three hundred cases on privacy and that right has been clearly recognized in about
thirty-five jurisdictions. It has been rejected in Nebraska, Rhode Island, Texas, and
Wisconsin. There are statutes in New York, Oklahoma, Utah, and Virginia limiting the
right of privacy to the commercial use of a name or likeness. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 867 (1939); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971).
166RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, Intrusion Upon Seclusion, comment b
(Tent. Draft No. 13 1967): "The invasion may be by physical intrusion into a place in
which the plaintiff has secluded himself .... It may also be by the use of the defendant's
senses, with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff's private
affairs...."
167Hamilton v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 82 So.2d 61, 64 (La. App. 1955); 138
A.L.R. 22, 28 (1942).
168 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 165.
19 ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 8; HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 5; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6; ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 41-1426 (1947).
170ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 436(2) (1958) (prohibits a male, during the nighttime, from
looking into a room occupied by a female); CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(g) (West 1970)
(the prohibition is against visual intrusions which involve trespass in the nighttime); GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-2002 (Harrison Supp. 1971); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-4910 to 4912
(Burns 1956); LA. REV. STAT. § 14:284 (Supp. 1973); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§ 3960 (1964) (the prohibition is against visual intrusions which involve trespass in
the nighttime); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 580 (1971) (the prohibition is against
visual intrusions which involve trespass); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.167 (Supp.
1972); N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202 (1969) (prohibits persons from peering into a room
occupied by a female); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1171 (Supp. 1972); S. C. CODE
ANN. § 16-554 (1962) (§ 16-555 states that § 16-554 shall not be interpreted to dimin-
ish the existing powers of law enforcement officers); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1212
(1955); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-174 (1950) (the prohibition is against visual intrusion
which involves trespass in the nighttime).
[ Vol. 23 :63
22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol23/iss1/35
KATZ AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
from the confusion which Katz has caused in the area of plain view,
or perhaps it is the result of the term "plain view." Whatever the
reason, the strict enforcement of the limitations placed on the plain
view doctrine would minimize the abuse which accompanies eaves-
dropping and search by peep.
The Necessity of Stringent Enforcement of
Fourth Amendment Prohibitions
There is a necessity that fourth amendment rights be jealously
guarded and that fourth amendment prohibitions be strictly enforced.
The methods by which fourth amendment rights can be given vitality
are not only attainable, but desirable for a number of important policy
considerations.
First, there are considerations as to the safety of law enforce-
ment officers engaged in surreptitious activities. In times when the
crime rate is high and a great many citizens are armed, there is a
great personal danger to the lives of police officers who go about
peeking through windows, peering into closed buildings, and crawl-
ing on the ground near garages, especially when such activity occurs
at night. These situations recall the words of Mr. Justice Jackson in
speaking of the possibility that frightened citizens might shoot police
officers who attempted to break into a dwelling:
... [A] plea of justifiable homicide might result awkwardly
for enforcement officers. But an officer seeing a gun being
drawn on him might shoot first. Under the circumstances of
this case, I should not want the task of convincing a jury
that it was not murder. I have no reluctance in condemning
as unconstitutional a method of law enforcement so reckless
and so fraught with danger and discredit to the law enforce-
ment agencies themselves."'
A similar situation exists today with law enforcement officers sneak-
ing around people's homes, peeking through windows and trying to
overhear conversations, all the while trying to conceal not just their
identity but their very presence. With the exception of the no-knock
laws, it is hard to imagine a more reckless or more dangerous policy
of law enforcement.
Second, there are serious considerations as to judicial integrity.
Few would argue that respect for the judiciary is gained as a result of
permitting surreptitious peeping and eavesdropping. However, a more
serious consideration is the effect on the integrity of the judiciary,
and indeed, the effect on the integrity of the entire criminal justice
system, when information is admitted into evidence that was ob-
171 MacDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 460-61 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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tained only by committing torts such as common law trespass or in-
trusion upon seclusion. The seriousness of condoning such conduct,
by allow such information to be admitted into evidence, was suggested
by Mr. Justice Brandeis:
Our government is the potent, the omnipresent, teacher. For
good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.
Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a law
breaker, it breeds contempt for the law .... 172
But the most compelling reason for protecting fourth amendment
rights lies in the nature of the protections that the fourth amend-
ment was designed to offer. Long before the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights, the security of an individual's privacy was considered
fundamental to all liberty, and this belief was expressed in the com-
mon law maxim that "every man's home is his castle."173 The depth
to which this security was prized is best found in the words of
Lord Chatham:
•.. [T]he poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to
all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may
shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter;
the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter
-all his forces dare not cross the threshold of the ruined
tenement.174
This maxim, that a man's home is his castle, was made a part
of the constitutional law of this nation in "the clauses prohibiting
unreasonable searches and seizures ."175 The fourth amendment
stands as
. . . recognition of the fact that in this nation individual
liberty depends in large part upon freedom from unreason-
able intrusion by those in authority.1 76
172 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
l1 3Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 47 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
174 United States v. Three Tons of Coal, 28 F. Cas. 149, 151 (No. 16,515) (D.C.E.D.
Wisc. 1875). This statement has also been attributed to William Pitt the Elder in
BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 426 (14th ed. 1967).
Is Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1913), quoting COOLEY, J., A TREATISE ON
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF
THE UNITED STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 425, 426 (1st ed. 1868); see United
States v. Three Tons of Coal, 28 F. Cas. 149, 151 (No. 16,515) (D.C.E.D. Wisc.
1875).
176 Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 700 (1948). See In re Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32
F. 241, 250 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887), where Mr. Justice Field indicated that without the
right of personal security, all other rights "would lose half their value."
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Indeed, the fourth amendment, is regarded as "the very essence of
constitutional liberty .. ,"17
So important are fourth amendment rights that they are to be
liberally construed in order to prevent unconstitutional practices
which "get their footing .. .by silent approaches and slight devia-
tions from legal modes of procedures."1 7 8 But perhaps the full extent
of the protections afforded by the fourth amendment was best of-
fered by Mr. Justice Brandeis, who indicated that the makers of the
constitution
. . . conferred, as against the government, the right to be
left alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every
unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy
of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the 4th Amendment. 179
The practices sought to be justified in the name of Katz: the
warrantless searches of a man's home when he is in the custody of
law enforcement officers, the peeping through his windows, the eaves-
dropping outside his door, the use of binoculars and artificial light
to see that which would otherwise be hidden from view, and the sug-
gestion that fourth amendment protections can vanish with the post-
ing of signs warning of surveillance or searches, are nothing more
than a new manifestation of arbitrary governmental intrusion which
the fourth amendment was designed to prohibit. It is inconceivable
that the fourth amendment would prohibit arbitrary governmental
intrusions in one form, only to allow the very same abuse to take
place in another form. Indeed, this is the very point which Mr. Justice
Bradley made when speaking of the purpose of the fourth amendment
and the intentions of the founding fathers:
The struggles against arbitrary power in which they had
been engaged for more than 20 years would have been too
deeply engraved in their memories to have allowed them to
approve of such insidious disguises of the old grievance which
they had so deeply abhorred.180
177Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921). In Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 180 (1949), Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting, stated that "Among deprivations
of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual
and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and
most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government."
,n Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
19 Compare Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
with Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), where Mr. Justice Bradley con-
cluded that fourth amendment protection applied to prohibit "all invasions on the part
of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies
of life."
180Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
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That "old grievance" of arbitrary governmental intrusion must not
be tolerated simply because it is now disguised in a different form,
for whether caused by the knock at the door and the serving of the
hated general warrants, by arbitrary surreptitious surveillance, or
by the use of signs and arguments to defeat a subjective expectation
of privacy, the result is the same:
• . . [N]ot one man but a whole nation can become cowed
and frigid. Without privacy the soul of man withers. This
right is the atmosphere of our freedom; it is like the air we
breathe, enveloping, invisible, yet sustaining, so long as it is
there. Without it other rights will perish, especially free
speech and assembly. What is the right of free speech and
free assembly if Big Brother is listening?181
Conclusion
The problem of fourth amendment protections has been a trouble-
some one for the courts. While there are a great many decisions and
commentaries dealing with fourth amendment rights, there had been
little consideration, prior to Katz, of the issues involved in determin-
ing whether a search and seizure had taken place. Under Olmstead,
a search and seizure required a trespass and the seizure of tangible
items. In Silverman, the trespass requirement was replaced by a
necessity for an actual intrusion, and the scope of the fourth amend-
ment was extended to include intangible items.
Katz established the test under which it was held that there was
a violation of fourth amendment rights if the conduct of government
agents violated the privacy upon which an individual justifiably relied.
The cases subsequent to Katz give at least a general outline of the
expectations of privacy which are and are not justifiable. These cases
may generally be divided into two groups: those which utilize a sub-
jective emphasis approach and those which utilize an objective em-
phasis approach. It is the former approach which is open to most
abuse and which, as such, has received the most attention in this note.
For the purpose of ensuring the privacy and security which are
guaranteed under the Constitution, a number of alternatives to cur-
rent practices have been presented. It is suggested that some or all
of these alternatives are necessary for the personal safety of law
enforcement officers and the preservation of judicial integrity. But
the most compelling reason to strengthen fourth amendment protec-
tions is the nature of the evil which the fourth amendment was de-
signed to prevent and the key role which fourth amendment rights
play in the preservation of all our other liberties.
181 State v. Carluccio, 116 N. J. Super. 49, 54, 280 A.2d 853, 858 (1971).
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Fourth amendment protections and the liberties that flow with
them are not conditioned upon having the wealth to build a police-
proof fortress in which to hide, or upon the willingness to sacrifice
such natural rights as fresh air and sunshine. Justice Stewart was
right; the fourth amendment does in fact mean that every man has
the right to retreat into his own home and there be free from un-
reasonable intrusion. And that freedom is not simply freedom from
physical intrusion, but freedom from "every unjustified intrusion by
the government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever means
employed .... 1182
As Justice Bradley explained over eighty years ago:
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of
his drawers that constitutes the essence of the offense; but
it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty and private property .... 183
It is this fourth amendment purpose, to protect the personal security
and personal liberty of the people, that compels an application of Katz
that will prohibit all arbitrary governmental intrusions, no matter
what form they may take.
Richard L. Aynest
182 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
183 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
t Law Review Editor; second year student, the Cleveland State University College of Law.
1974]
27Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1974
